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Abstract
Some consequences of uncertainties in radiobiological risk due to
galactic cosmic ray exposure are analyzed to determine their effect on
engineering designs for a first lunar outpost--a 60-day lunar mission.
Quantitative estimates of shield mass requirements as a function of
a radiobiological uncertainty factor are given for a simplified vehicle
structure. The additional shield mass required for compensation is
calculated as a function of the uncertainty in galactic cosmic ray
exposure, and this mass is found to be as large as a factor of 3 for
a lunar transfer vehicle. The additional cost resulting from this mass
is also calculated. These cost estimates are then used to exemplify the
cost-effectiveness of research.
Introduction
Exposure to radiation in human space exploration
is an unavoidable occupational hazard. However, if
the probability that crew members will experience
harmful effects from radiation can be adequately re-
duced, the risks may be judged acceptable when
mission objectives and other mission risks are con-
sidered. Radiation exposure risks are characterized
as stochastic and nonstochastic. The main stochas-
tic effect is cancer induction, and the main non-
stochastic effects are early prodromal response, tem-
porary sterility, and lens opacity.
In the United States, the current criteria for defin-
ing acceptable risk levels are those recommended by
the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP). The criteria are based on an
analysis of annual fatality rates from accidents in dif-
ferent occupations. On this basis, risk of stochastic
effects is defined in terms of the increase in lifetime
probability, above and beyond the natural incidence,
that the radiation exposure will result in fatal cancer.
According to this definition, an acceptable risk level
for this excess probability is 3 percent or less (ref. 1).
Such a risk is considered acceptable for routine space
operations in low Earth orbit. Similarly, the NCRP
has also established dose limits to reduce the risk of
nonstochastic effects(ref. 1).
For low Earth orbit (LEO), the predominant radi-
ation exposure is from electrons and protons. For this
radiation, extrapolations based on existing radiobio-
logical data may be adequate for establishing expo-
sure limits. These limits (table 1) are given in terms
of common radiation protection quantities, such as
the dose D, the dose equivalent H, and the quality
factor Q relating D to H:
H=QD (1)
Table I. Exposure Limits for LEO Operations
Exposure
time
Exposure limits, Sv
Blood-forming
organs Eye Skin
30 days .25 1 I 1.5
Annual .50 2 I 3.0Career a[2 + 0.075 (age - To)] 4 6.0
aAverage career dose-equivalent limit for both male (To = 30)
and female (To = 38) astronauts for a 3-percent increase of cancer
risk (ref. 1).
In equation (1), the quality factor is a function of the
linear energy transfer (LET) of the radiation. The
exact functional form is prcscribed in the process of
establishing radiation guidelines that make Q a leg-
islated quantity rather than the result of a measure-
ment. However, the dependence of Q on LET, Q(L),
is intended to reflect a judgment related to the de-
pendence of relative biological effectiveness (RBE) on
LET. For a radiation field with a distribution of LET
values, the use of the following average quality factor
(ref. 1) is required:
1 Q(L)_LdL (2)
where _ is the dose contribution per unit LET
interval.
For galactic cosmic rays (GCR's) and, in partic-
ular, for the highly charged, energetic nuclei (HZE
particles) that constitute their biologically most sig-
nificant components, these quantities may no longer
provide an adequate description of the radiation risk
(ref. 1). Evidence that extrapolations from exist-
ing radiobiological data are not adequate has been
provided by the measurement of sister chromatid
exchanges in resting human lymphocytes irradiated
with 23Spua-particles(ref. 2), by the observation
ofabnormalitiesin stemcellcoloniesurvivingsimi-
lar a-particleirradiation(ref.3), andby thepartial
disintegrationof chromosomesafterirradiationwith
high-energyheavyion beamsto simulatespacera-
diation (ref. 4). In theseexamples,thenotionof a
quality factorrelatedto RBEbecomesmeaningless.
That is,at dosescomparablewith thosedeliveredby
oneor a fewparticlesandfor radiationeffectsthat
arenotmanifestforlowLET radiation(e.g.,X-rays),
the RBE becomesinfinite. Thus,newmethodsto
predicttheriskresultingfromexposureto GCRra-
diationmustbedeveloped.
In additionto the problemsposedby radiation
effectsthat arenot observableat referencedosesof
lowLET radiation,riskestimatesareuncertain,even
forknownradiationeffects.In theUnitedStates,the
NASA SpaceRadiationHealthProgramhasbeen
establishedto sponsoresearchintendedto further
"the scientificbasisfor the radiationprotectionof
humansengagedin theexplorationofspace"(ref.5).
A major programobjectiveis to reducethe un-
certaintyin thepredictionof radiationrisk sothat
it is within a factorof 2 (50-to 200-percentrange)
by 1997andwithinafactorof 1.25(+25percent)by
2010,mssho_min figure1.
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Figure 1. NASA Space Radiation Health Program estimates
for current and projected risk uncertainties.
The current uncertainty in risk predictions is
estimated to bc as large as an order of magnitude (10-
to 1000-percent range). This value is no more than
an educated guess obtained with the assumption that
the uncertainty of a factor of 10 is the uncertainty in
the prediction of shielding effectiveness (a factor of 2
to 3) combined with the uncertainty in predicting
biological response to HZE particles (a factor of 4
to 5).
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Engineers and mission planners must compensate
for these uncertainties to ensure that risk limits arc
not exceeded. Depending on policies and engineering
judgment, the compensation required may be 1, 2, or
more standard deviations (with a Gaussian distribu-
tion assumed for the uncertainties). For example,
if predictions of risk are considered to be accurate
only within an order of magnitude (factor of 10), the
shielding of a spacecraft required to remain below a
3-percent excess cancer risk may, in reality, be de-
signed for a 30-percent excess cancer risk because
these uncertainties are not reflected in the shield de-.
sign. Thus, this design is clearly not acceptable.
In view of such large uncertainties, the shield mass
should be greatly increased to ensure that the excess
cancer risks do not exceed 3 percent.
The compensation required for uncertainty can
significantly increase costs. If the shielding thickness
of a lunar or Martian habitat has to be increased by
a factor of 2, the total shield volume (mass) would
increase by more than a factor of 2. As the vol-
ume increases, the time necessary for a constant work
force to assemble the habitat increases; increasing the
work force requires transporting more mass to orbit
or increasing the number of launches. The assembly
time is mostly extravehicular activity (EVA) time,
and the Shuttle cannot presently support extensive
EVA. Time is also quantized. Thus, the duration of
one mission is expected to bc 30 to 60 days. If habi-
tat assembly extends beyond one mission duration,
the number of launches doubles. If habitat assembly
eXtends beyond two mission durations, the number
of launches triples. Faster assembly of the habitat
requires more machinery. Thus, the cost of machin-
ery development, testing, and deployment must be
.added to the cost of launching the machinery mass.
Figure 2 shows some of these relationships.
Another example Of the complex effect of in-
creasing shielding to account for uncertainties in risk
habitat (>_21___or e mass
i._:__>2) I - [launches ]- [ toorbit
Figure 2. Logic diagram showing effects of increased shiehting
on launch requirements.
predictionisshownin figure3,whichisa schematic
viewof atypicalsolarenergeticparticle(SEP)event.
TheX-raysarriveat the lunarsurfacewithin9 min-
utesof tile start of tile eventandcanbeusedasa
warningsignalto crews.Significantparticlefluxes
wouldbegin to be experiencedAT1 minutes (or
hours) later and would rapidly increase until, at a
time AT2 after the initial warning, the radiation lev-
els inside a shielded rover vehicle on the lunar sur-
face would exceed allowed limits. Before this time,
the crew must find a storm shelter or return to the
safety of the shielded base.
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Figure 3. Limits on exploration range due to possible SEP
events. Area = rv2(AT)2; v depends on shielding and
determines fuel requirements; AT depends on shielding
and forecasting ability.
The maximum distance that a lunar rover vehicle
can be allowed to travel away from a safe location is
given by vAT, where v is the velocity of the rover.
This distance gives the maximum area that can be
explored in one sortie, Amax = rv2(AT) 2. Thus, at
constant velocity, the sortie range is determined by
the warning time and by the rover speed, ttigher
rover speed may require more fuel, more batteries,
or larger engines, and it may also result in less vehi-
cle reliability and, hence, more spare parts or backup
vehicles. All of these requirements necessitate more
mass lifted from Earth. Increasing the rover shielding
to extend sortie time may reduce the speed and may
result in similar increased mass requirements. Estab-
lishing shielded refuges to increase the surface range
requires an increase in construction time and may
lead to supply mission restrictions that are quantized
(more launches). Another alternative is to delay sur-
face exploration until a permanently inhabited base
is established.
Current estimates of exposure (ref. 6) obtained
during the establishment of a permanent lunar or
Martian outpost clearly show that galactic cosmic
rays limit the radiation risk (including career lim-
its for astronauts). The uncertainties previously dis-
cussed will have a large impact on mission design and
trade-offs between mission design costs, which could
be greatly reduced by reducing these uncertainties
through further research. As beneficial as research
is for missions of long duration, what are the effects
of uncertainties in biological response and shielding
properties on missions of shorter duration? In the
following sections, this question is considered in the
context of a 60-day lunar mission.
There is interest within NASA to plan a return
to the Moon for a mission duration of 45 to 60 days
to establish the first lunar outpost (FLO). I Unlike
the Mars mission or permanent lunar base where ex-
posure to HZE particles plays a dominant role, the
60-day mission has a total GCR dose of 70 mSv or
less (ref. 6). The main shield design is determined for
protection from a possible SEP event and not from
HZE exposure. In the following sections, a simple
shielding configuration is assumed, and its modifica-
tion to account for the uncertainties in risk prediction
is calculated to illustrate their effects on a 60-day lu-
nar mission. The low dose due to GCR's allows for
linear approximations using risk coefficients. Finally,
the model is used to estimate the effects of uncer-
tainty on mass and projected mission costs.
While the methodology is general and can be ap-
plied to other space exploration missions, the ap-
proach described in this paper allows us to esti-
mate the effects of uncertainty in radiation risk.
1NASA Exploration Program Office Report: FLO Mis-
sion Overview, May 1992.
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Theseestimatesmustbeincorporatedintoengineer-
ingdesignsat theearliestpossiblestate,sothat we
canrealisticallyassesstheimpactof radiationprotec-
tion limits. Theapproachdescribedherealsooffers
someinsightintotheproblemsof extrapolatingfrom
thecurrentradiationlimits,whicharcvalidforLEO,
to obtainvalidlimitsforexogeomagnetosphericspace
exploration.
Uncertainty in Risk Estimates
In therelativeriskmodel(ref.7), anindividual's
age-specificcanceriskcanbcwrittenas
3'(H)-_%(1+ kRH ) (3)
In this equation, the notation of reference 7 has been
modified to use H (instead of d) for dose equivalent
and k n (instead of al) for risk coefficient, the excess
risk function has been approximated as g(3) -_ 1,
and a linear dose dependence has been assumed.
From equation (3), the relative excess risk R R can
be defined as
z(H) -
R R = = kRH (4)
_/o
In this approximation, R R is independent of the nat-
ural incidence of cancer, and H is the dose equivalent
(in Sv). The excess risk is
R =  oknH = kH = k(Yx + Hz) (5)
where Hx is the component of the dose equivalent
due to low LET radiation, and Hz is the dose equiv-
alent duc to the HZE component of thc radiation.
We nmke the further approximation that the uncer-
tainties in k and H.r are negligible in comparison with
the uncertainty in Hz, and from this approximation
we obtain the following equation:
AR = k-_ H_ - kUHz (6)
Thus, the net effect of the uncertainty in R is an
increase in the relative excess risk, which becomes
R + AR = kH + kUHz = kHu (7)
Equation (7) defines an effective dose equivalent Hu,
which corresponds to the increased risk due to un-
certainties. If a limit L is defined on the basis of R,
then it, is required that
R + AR <_ L (8)
A safety factor S can bc defined with reference to
equation (7). Let S be an upper bound on the es-
timated value of the uncertainty in the HZE dose
equivalent S = nU, where n = 1, 2,... corresponds to
the number of standard deviations required to estab-
lish an acceptable safety margin. Then equation (7)
becomes
R + AR -- kH + kSHz = kHs (9)
where the effective dose equivalent, including the
safety factor, is given by Hs = H + SHz. Alter-
natively, the HZE component in equation (4) can be
increased according to Hz I = Hz + SHz = (1 + S)Hz.
This formulation suggests the possibility of using the
ratio between experimental values of RBE and Q as
an approximation for 1 + S. For example, the mea-
sured RBE for life shortening in mice has been re-
ported to be as large as 80 for fission neutrons (ref. 8),
while the estimated value of Q is at most 20. Thus,
an estimate for the value of S is 3, which corresponds
to an effective dose equivalent that is 300 percent
greater than one obtained from currently accepted
dosimetric analyses. Such a value (300 percent) may
bc considered reasonable from a radiobiological point
of view and may not bc too restrictive for a 60-day
lunar mission.
Effects of Uncertainty on Shield Design
To determine the effects of uncertainty on shield
design, we consider the following example. An as-
tronaut on a 60-day lunar mission is exposed to
the low-level GCR background and is subject to
the possibility of a large SEP event. For this ex-
ample, we consider only the shielding of the blood-
forming organs (BFO's), as this exposure is closely
related to overall life shortening due to neoplastic
disease. Because the mission time is not yet spec-
ified, we assume the solar minimum environment
(maximum exposure) prescribed by the Naval Re-
search Laboratory Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-
Electronics (CREME) model (ref. 9). The observed
SEP's vary in spectral characteristics and intensi-
ties; thus, for design considerations, wc assume an
SEP model consisting of the spectrum envelope that
bounds the observed fluence at any observed en-
ergy. This SEP model is similar to the Viking mis-
sion design criteria, 2 except the envelope is now
given by the February 1956, November 1960, and
August 1972 events. (See fig. 4.) The differen-
tial fluence spectral envelope _a(E) is determined
2NASA Viking Project Office Report: Viking Project 75,
April 1972, (M75-125-2).
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Figure4. EstimateofmaximumfluencespectrumforanSEP
event.
byexpressionsderivedfromtheindividualflarespec-
tral characteristics(ref.10)andisgivenanalytically
aN
T(E) = Max(f1, f2, f3) (10)
where
fl = 6.0 x 107exp[-(E 10)/'25] + 9.4 x 105exp[ (E - 100)/320]
f2 = 6.3 x 10Sexp[ (E - 10)/12] + 4.9 x 106exp[-(E - 100)/80]
f3 = 3.0 x 10s exp[-(E - 30)/26.5]
In equation (10), E is energy in MeV and _ is in
units of protons/cm2-MeV. The fl, f2, and f3 values
represent fluences for the 1956, 1960, and 1972 flares,
respectively.
The total BFO dose equivalent as a function of
shield thickness for a water-equivalent shield has
been calculated with the Langley nucleon trans-
port code BRYNTRN (ref. 11) for the flare spec-
trum and with the heavy ion/nucleon transport code
HZETRN (ref. 12) for the GCR contribution. The aN-
sumcd quality factor is the one specified by ICRP-26
(ref. 13). For simplicity, shield configurations are
taken as spherical shells of constant thickness, and
the dose evaluations are made at the center of the
sphere. The variation of dose equivalent with shell
thickness is evaluated for two configurations: (1) a
complete spherical shell representing a lunar transfer
vehicle (LTV) in cis-lunar space and (2) a hemispher-
ical shell representing a habitat on the lunar surface.
The dose equivalents have been computed for a mis-
sion duration of 60 days: 45 days on the lunar sur-
face, 5 days of transit time each way, and 5 days in
low Earth orbit. The dose of the LTV differs from
the dose of the habitat by a factor of 2 aN a result of
shielding of the habitat by the moon.
The dose equivalents of the LTV and habitat are
shown in figure 5 for the 60-day mission. The BFO
dose equivalents have been evaluated according to the
human body geometry specified in reference 14 for
the NASA Computerized Anatomical Man (CAM).
Using equation (7) to specify a dose-equivalent
uncertainty in the GCR dose equivalent along with
the functions for the dose equivalent versus shield
thickness (fig. 5), the shield thickness requirements
are determined as a function of GCR dose uncer-
tainty. These results are shown in figure 6 for the
LTV and the habitat. To extend the shield thick-
nesses to shield mass requirements, we examine two
versions of the LTV model (a totally shielded vehicle
and a vehicle with a storm shelter) along with the
hemispherical habitat. (See fig. 7.) For the totally
shielded vehicle, we chose a minimum interior volume
corresponding to reasonable astronaut performance
(10.5 m 3 per person from ref. 15) for a four-member
crew. For the LTV with a storm shelter, the heavily
shielded volume is assumed to be one-third as large aN
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Figure 5. Estimated worst-case BFO exposure from SEP
events, with spherical shell shielding thicknesses assumed.
160
140
_-_120
100
._ 80
-v
•_ 60
E 4O
e-
_ 2o
<
Habitat
! ! I t L.., I
] 50 300 450 600 750 900
HZE dose uncertainty, percent
Figure 6. Shield thicknesses required to meet 30-day dose
limit, with an assumed uncertainty in HZE risk
coefficients.
in the following manner. By taking tile total cost of
the Apollo program (about 24 billion dollars (1970))
and the approximate payload weight of the combined
eight lunar missions (about 800 000 lb from ref. 16),
we calculated that the per mass cost for a hmar mis-
sion is about 30000 dollars/lb or 66 million dollars
metric ton (tonne). Whcn this value is chosen and
used in conjunction with the shield mass versus un-
certainty plots shown in figure 8, the excess cost of
the 60-day lunar mission due to GCR risk uncertain-
ties is determined. (See fig. 9.) We believe these
excess cost estimates are conservative in the sense
that the actual missions costs would prove to be sig-
nificantly higher. Figure 9 shows that an uncertainty
of 300 percent adds over 1 billion dollars to the mis-
sion cost. However, an uncertainty factor reduction
program is likely to cost significantly less; thus, the
cost-effectiveness of research is demonstrated.
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Figure 7. Lunar transfer vehicle and habitat configurations
for a 60-day hmar mission.
the completely shielded vehicle. The surface habitat
volume is equated to that of the totally shielded
LTV. With these specified dimensions, the required
masses are readily evaluated and are given in figure 8.
Despite the relatively small contribution from GCR's
to the total dose, substantial increases in required
shield mass are necessary to offset large biological
risk uncertainties for GCR's.
Accurately relating increased payload mass to ele-
vation in mission cost for future lunar missions is very
difficult. At best, rough estimates can be made on
the basis of past history, which we attempted to use
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Figure 8. Estimated shield mass requirements to compensate
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Concluding Remarks
The effect of risk uncertainties due to heavy
ion galactic cosmic ray (GCR) exposure for rela-
tively short-duration lunar missions has been ana-
lyzed. The results indicate that shield design and
mission cost arc significantly affected by these uncer-
tainties. The analysis does not include the effect of
uncertainties in shielding properties (including radia-
tion transport), the effect of linear energy transfer de-
pendence on risk coefficients, quadratic terms in the
dose response function, dose rate considerations, and
other effects that may need to bc considered for spe-
cial circumstances or longer duration missions; fur-
thermore, shield requirements have been estimated
for simple configurations in a severe (but not nec-
essarily unreasonable) worst-case solar flare environ-
ment. Nevertheless, the results show that GCR risk
uncertainties can dramatically impact many lunar
mission parameters and that such calculations need
to bc incorporated into engineering design consider-
ations at an early stage. Finally, the calculation pre-
sented here offers a new approach to understanding
the cost-effectiveness of investment in research.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
December 1, 1992
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